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‘Domination,	   domestication,	   and	   love	   are	   deeply	   entangled.	   Home	   is	   where	  
dependencies	   within	   and	   among	   species	   reach	   their	   most	   stifling.	   For	   all	   its	   hyped	  
pleasure,	  perhaps	  this	  is	  not	  the	  best	  idea	  for	  multi-­‐species	  life	  on	  earth’	  (Tsing,	  2012:	  
141).	  
	  
‘No	   matter	   how	   clever	   and	   crafty	   our	   novelists,	   they	   are	   no	   match	   for	   engineers’	  





Houses	   are	   places	   to	   be,	   where	   the	  micro-­‐conditions	   for	   living,	   resting	   and	   interacting	   are	  
generated	   and	   maintained.	   They	   are	   places	   of	   protection;	   protection	   from	   predators	   and	  
from	   more	   elemental	   assaults	   such	   as	   meteorological	   extremes.	   They	   may	   also	   be	   places	  
where	  prey	  is	  trapped	  and	  consumed	  or	  unpackaged	  and	  cooked.	  Birds	  construct	  their	  nests	  
to	  protect	   the	  young	  once	  born	  and	  the	  mother	  bird	  during	   incubation.	  The	  nests’	   location,	  
and	   sometimes	   their	   construction	   (materials,	   design),	   prohibit,	   or	   at	   least	   reduce,	   the	  
likelihood	  of	  predation.	  A	  nest	  is	  a	  (temporary)	  ‘home’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  might	  encompass	  a	  
social	  group,	  it	  is	  a	  place	  to	  which	  the	  adults	  and	  the	  young	  ‘return’	  (or	  ‘home’)	  for	  comfort,	  
protection,	  un-­‐threatening	  interaction,	  food	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  the	  UK,	  there	  is	  an	  additional	  layer	  
of	   protection	   at	   work.	   It	   is	   an	   offence,	   under	   the	   1981	  Wildlife	   and	   Countryside	   Act,	   (for	  
humans)	  to	  intentionally	  destroy	  or	  damage	  the	  nest	  of	  any	  wild	  bird	  while	  it	  is	  in	  use	  or	  being	  
built.	  	  
	  
Some	   migrating	   animals,	   birds	   and	   fish	   return	   cyclically	   to	   a	   specific	   location	   –	   a	   more	  
spatially	   extensive	   ‘home’	   place.	   Yet,	   while	   many	   animals	   build	   homes,	   by	   no	   means	   all	  
occupy	  them	  in	  any	  permanent	  sense.	  In	  our	  fiction,	  Badger’s	  houses	  may	  have	  door	  scrapers	  
and	  Toads	  grow	  up	  in	  Halls,	  but,	  as	  Von	  Uexkull	  (2010)	  reminds	  us,	  in	  their	  ‘natural’	  state	  the	  
animal’s	  house	   is	  often	  mobile	  or	  transitory;	  a	  temporary	  site	  of	  nurture,	  safety	  or	  defence,	  
an	  opportunist	  and	  transitory	  halt,	  where	  food	  might	  be	  more	  abundant	  and	  some	  security	  is	  
to	  be	  found	  in	  what	  is	  often	  an	  otherwise	  itinerant	  life.	  Describing	  the	  nest-­‐building	  behaviour	  
of	  chimpanzees,	  Goodall	  (1962)	  observes	  the	  construction	  of	  new	  nests	  each	  and	  every	  night,	  
the	   fresh	   foliage	  of	   the	  tree-­‐nests	  offering	  greater	  warmth	  and	  comfort.	  A	  single	  great	  ape,	  
estimate	   Fruth	   and	   Hohmann	   (1994),	   may	   build	   as	   many	   as	   19,000	   shelters	   in	   a	   lifetime.	  
Burrowing	   and	   nesting	   animals	   create	   houses	   of	   variable	   longevity	   –	   the	   naked	   mole-­‐rat	  
(Heterocephalus	   glaber)	  may	   remain	   located	   in	   an	   elaborate	   burrow	   system	   all	   its	   life,	   like	  
many	   insect	   species	   –	   while	   ranging	   mammals,	   such	   the	   reindeer	   or	   the	   lion	   make	   little	  
provision	   for	   semi-­‐permanent	   shelter	   of	   even	   the	   most	   temporary	   kind	   other	   than	   the	  
occasional	  selection	  of	  an	  appropriate	  nesting	  or	  birthing	  site.	  	  
	  
However	   temporary,	   these	   ‘houses’	   are	   nonetheless	   ‘beastly	   places’	   where	   intraspecific	  
communication	   is	  enabled,	  where	   infants	   learn	   from	  adults	  and	  each	  other	   (Hansell,	   2005),	  
where	  sociability	  is	  generated	  and	  social	  evolution	  enabled	  (Hansell,	  1993).	  Housing	  becomes	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a	  critical	   reinforcing	  act	  of	   internalising	  and	  externalising,	   selfing	  and	  othering,	  defining	   the	  
line	  between	   familiar	  and	   the	  unknown,	   the	  wanted	  and	   the	  unwanted,	   the	   controlled	  and	  
the	   uncontrolled.	   For	   human	   and	   other	   animals,	   the	   ‘home’	   can	   be	   the	   sovereign	   locus	   of	  
individual	  territoriality.	  	  
	  
When	  we	  humans	  ‘house’	  animals	  (the	  foremost	  act	  of	  domestication),	  we	  undertake	  a	  form	  
of	  anthropocentric	  spatial	  fixity,	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  expressly	  ‘animal	  space’,	  as	  distinct	  from	  a	  
‘beastly	  place’	  (Philo	  and	  Wilbert,	  2000);	  a	  place	  of	  confinement,	  of	  de-­‐naturalisation	  yet	  one	  
that	   can	   also	   be,	   to	   a	   degree,	   an	   act	   of	   ‘humanisation’	   (Nast,	   2006);	   a	   ‘zoo-­‐ontological	  
production’	  (Shukin	  2009).	  The	  mobility,	  and	  spatial	  fluidity	  of	  the	  ‘natural’	  and	  wild	  animal,	  
unharnessed	  and	  uncontained,	  does	  not	  always	  serve	  us	  well.	  Though,	   increasingly,	   it	   is	  not	  
only	  domesticated	  animals	  that	  we	  ‘house’,	  whether	  on	  the	  farm,	  in	  the	  zoo	  or	  in	  our	  homes,	  
but	   wild	   animals	   too	   into	   defined	   areas	   of	   carefully	   bordered	   and	   protected	   ‘naturalness’.	  	  
Whatmore	   and	   Thorne	   (2000)	   demonstrate	   that	   even	   the	   wilder	   spaces	   along	   with	   their	  
occupants	  have	  long	  been	  enrolled	  in	  a	  relational	  topology	  that	  is	  a	  form	  of	  both	  semiotic	  and	  
material	   placing.	   Some	   animals	   house	   themselves,	   some	   animals	   have	   housing	   thrust	   upon	  
them,	  others	  (an	  increasing	  number)	  are	  born	  housed.	  
	  
For	   some	   ‘pet’	   or	   ‘companion’	   animals	   in	  Western	   societies,	   the	   outside	   kennel	   has	   been	  
gradually	   been	   replaced	   as	   the	   quintessential	   animal	   ‘house’	   by	   shared	  human/non-­‐human	  
indoor	  living	  spaces,	  extending	  to	  shared	  beds	  and	  eating-­‐places.	  The	  human	  home/house	  is	  
redefined	  by	  animal	  presence.	  Jean	  Cocteau	  loved	  his	  cats	  because,	  in	  his	  words,	  “I	  enjoy	  my	  
home;	  and	   little	  by	   little,	   they	  become	   its	  visible	  soul”	   (1951,	  568).	  Even	  Deleuze,	   infamous	  
for	   his	   ‘anyone	  who	   like	   cats	   or	   dogs	   is	   a	   fool’	   (Deleuze	   and	  Guatarri	   1996,	   p.	   265)	   readily	  
admits	   to	   sharing	   his	   home	  with	   a	   number	   of	   cats	   since	   the	   ‘fatal	  moment’,	  when	   his	   son	  
brought	   home	   a	   stray	   (Deleuze,	   1987).	   In	   a	   very	   literal	   re-­‐territorialisation,	   these	   are	   now	  
‘indoor’	  animals	  with	  little,	  if	  any,	  hope	  of	  rehabilitation.	  
	  
Across	   the	  world,	   zoo	  animals	   live	   in	  –	  or	   rather,	  are	  confined	   to	  –	  artificial	  and	  artefactual	  
dwellings	   (the	   ‘Lion	   House’,	   the	   ‘Monkey	   House’)	   whose	   design	   frequently	   reflects	  
fundamental	  human	  framings	  of	  both	  animal	  and	  human	  worlds	  (Mullan	  and	  Marvin,	  1998).	  
Here,	   protection	   and	   prohibition	   must	   co-­‐exist	   with	   visibility,	   with	   accessibility	   and	   with	  
(sometimes	   almost	   continual)	   interference.	   Although	   these	   are	   presented	   as	   the	   animals’	  
‘houses’,	   with	   nowadays,	   increasing	   reference	   to	   ‘natural	   habitat’,	   they	   are	   often,	   by	  
definition,	  very	  far	  from	  ‘home’.	  
	  
Farm	   animals	   are	   ‘housed’.	   The	   word	   now	   takes	   on	   a	   very	   different	   meaning.	   The	   word	  
‘house’	  is	  singularly	  inappropriate.	  There	  is	  little	  of	  the	  ‘house’	  and	  even	  less	  of	  the	  ‘home’	  in	  
a	  farrowing	  stall,	  a	  battery	  cage,	  a	  slaughter	  pen	  or	  even	  an	  industrial	  broiler	  shed.	  ‘Housing’	  
becomes	   an	   integral	   and	   intentional	   part	   of	   the	   controlling	   production	   environment	   and	  
process;	  it	  brings	  animals,	  machines,	  technologies	  and	  buildings	  together	  in	  a	  vocational	  and	  
techno-­‐scientific	  materiality	   that	   is	   –	   in	   certain	   circumstances	   -­‐	   almost	   indisassociable	   from	  
that	  of	  the	  animals	  themselves.	  	  In	  these	  artificialised	  spaces,	  social	  groups	  can	  be	  utterly	  re-­‐
defined	  as	  breed	  or	  species	  groups,	  often	  of	  a	  single	  gender,	  age	  and	  size.	  Family	  groups	  are	  
re-­‐constituted.	   In	   her	   film	   ‘Blackfish’,	   Cowperthwaite,	   shows	   how	   the	   so-­‐called	   families	   of	  
killer	  whales	   in	  the	  Sea	  World	  parks	  are	  not	  related	  individuals	  but	  assembled	  collections	  of	  
different	  ages	  from	  different	  sources.	  A	  tiger	  in	  a	  zoo	  display	  may	  urinate	  against	  the	  concrete	  
walls	  in	  a	  vain	  attempt	  to	  demark	  the	  memory	  of	  once-­‐guarded	  and	  patrolled	  territories	  but	  
more	   often	   than	   not,	   it	   is	   in	   response	   to	   some	   artificially	   introduced	   olfactory	   stimulation	  
(such	  as	  chilli,	  cinnamon	  or	  cumin	  powder).	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The	  worlds	  of	  these	  farmed	  and	  to	  a	   lesser	  extent	  zoo	  animals,	   like	  their	  bodies,	  even	  their	  
genes,	  are	  no	   longer	  their	  own.	  We	  sculpt	  animal	  bodies	  to	   fit	   into	  their	  housing	  and	  adapt	  
animal	   behaviour	   so	   they	   can	   live	  within	   their	   ‘housed’	   environment.	   Circularly,	   animal	   the	  
animals’	  physiological	  and	  psychological	  ability	  to	  cope	  with	  that	  housing	  come	  to	  define	  and	  
determine	   animal	   welfare.	   In	   this,	   the	   paradigms	   of	   protection	   and	   prevention	   become	  
hardened	   under	   a	   logic	   of	   near-­‐total	   control:	   via	   the	   protection	   (and	   enhancement)	   of	  
productive	   body	   processes	   through	   which	   the	   very	   materials	   and	   forms	   of	   housing	   units	  
encourage	   greater	   productivity	   and	   via	   the	   prevention	   of	   ‘outside’	   elements,	   be	   they	  
microbial	  or	  meteorological	  that	  might	  slow	  or	  deviate	  those	  processes.	  Perhaps,	  the	  ultimate	  
expression	  of	  productive	  animal	  housing	   is	   in-­‐vitro	  meat	  where	  all	   the	  un-­‐necessities	  of	   the	  
bios	  are	  removed.	  
	  
As	  the	  editors	  of	  this	  volume	  point	  out	  in	  their	  introduction,	  the	  forms	  and	  practices	  by	  which	  
humans	   house	   animals	   reveal	   complex	   concerns.	   At	   one	   level,	   these	   are,	   undeniably,	  
inevitably	   and	   intentionally	   instrumental	   and	  asymmetrical	   spaces,	   places	   and	   structures	  of	  
control	  in	  which	  human	  interests	  take	  precedence.	  Yet	  to	  see	  them	  entirely	  in	  this	  light	  is	  to	  
miss	   something.	   All	   of	   these	   ‘housed’	   animals	   are	   still	   living,	   mobile,	   sentient	   and	  
troublesome	  ‘critters’	  whose	  interwoven	  lives,	  and	  whose	  living	  of	  those	  live	  matters	  to	  them	  
and	   should	   matter	   to	   us.	   The	   farm	   is,	   as	   Porcher	   (2001)	   maintains,	   a	   space	   of	   interacting	  
human	   and	   non-­‐human	   umwelts,	   where	   both	   are	   -­‐	   albeit	   differentially	   -­‐	   housed.	   	   Current	  
interest	  amongst	  human/animal	  scholars	  and	  amongst	  animal	  welfare	  scientists	  for	  attention	  
to	   be	   paid	   to	   a	  more	   enlightened	   and	   relational	   accounting	   of	   the	   shared	   dwelling	   spaces,	  
materialities	  and	  co-­‐presences	  of	   the	   farm,	   the	  home,	   the	  zoo	  and	  even	   the	   ‘wild’	   (Kirksey,	  
2014),	   suggest	   that	   too	   instrumentalist	   and	  mechanistic	   a	   view	   of	   the	   purely	   physical	   and	  
environmental	   parameters	   (including	   housing)	   of	   animal	   lives	   might	   obscure	   alternative	  
approaches	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   those	   ‘naturalcultural	   contractual	   arrangements’	  
(Haraway,	  2008)	  of	  intra-­‐	  and	  inter-­‐species	  flourishing.	  	  
	  
In	  a	  couple	  of	  papers,	  Bruno	  Latour	  (1988;	  1995)	  considers	  doors,	  or	  more	  precisely	  a	  cartoon	  
cat	  flap	  built	  for	  a	  cartoon	  cat	  into	  a	  cartoon	  door	  and	  an	  artificial,	  non-­‐human	  hydraulic	  ‘door	  
closer’.	   In	   the	   former,	   the	   series	   of	   modifications	   made	   to	   the	   door	   to	   accommodate	   the	  
shifting	  priorities	  of	  human	  and	  non-­‐human	  actors	  illustrate	  the	  creative	  dance	  of	  redefining	  
relational	  interactions	  between,	  people,	  things	  and	  animals.	  In	  the	  latter,	  the	  automatic	  door	  
closer	   shapes,	   at	   least	   a	   little,	   bit,	   the	   worlds	   of	   those	   who	   pass	   through.	   For	   Latour,	   the	  
essence	   of	   both	   these	   devices	   or	   techniques	   is	   ‘the	   mediation	   of	   the	   relations	   between	  
people	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  things	  and	  animals	  on	  the	  other’	  (1995,	  p.	  1).	  The	  technical,	  the	  
non-­‐human	   and	   the	  human	   are	   all	   social	   actors	   and	   it	   becomes	   ‘useless	   to	   impose	   a	   priori	  
divisions	   between	  which	   skills	   are	   human	   and	  which	   are	   not	   human,	   which	   characters	   are	  
personified	  and	  which	  remain	  abstract’	  (1988,	  p.	  305)	  
	  
‘No	  one	  has	  ever	  seen	  a	  technique,	  and	  no	  one	  has	  ever	  seen	  a	  human.	  We	  only	  see	  
assemblies,	  crises,	  disputes,	   inventions,	  compromises,	  substitutions,	   translations,	  and	  
orderings	  that	  get	  more	  and	  more	  complicated	  and	  engage	  more	  and	  more	  elements’	  
(Latour	  1995,	  p	  6)	  
	  
How	   then	   do	   the	   multitudinous	   physical	   structures	   and	   techniques	   of	   animal	   housing	  
contribute	   to	   such	  assemblies?	   	   That,	   after	   all,	   has	  been	   the	   central	   question	  of	   this	   entire	  
volume.	   In	   the	   closing	   chapter,	   I	   want	   to	   think	   about	   how	   various	   housing	   practices	   and	  
structures	  both	  derive	  from,	  yet	  also	  trouble,	  the	  relations	  we	  humans	  might	  have	  –	  or	  think	  
we	  have	  -­‐	  with	  sentient,	  yet	  domesticated,	  non-­‐humans.	  In	  the	  final	  section	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  
want	   to	   imagine	   different	   endings.	   For	   many	   millions	   of	   domesticated	   animals,	   the	   final	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‘house’	  is	  the	  slaughterhouse	  where	  materialities	  are	  re-­‐fashioned.	  What	  possibilities,	  if	  any,	  
do	  these	  particular	  houses	  offer	  for	  anything	  more	  than	  absolute	  and	  violent	  domination.	  
	  
The	  cat	  litter	  tray	  	  
	  
The	  cat	  litter	  tray	  or	  litter	  box	  has	  become	  an	  essential	  convenience	  in	  the	  management	  and	  
practice	   of	   contemporary	   human-­‐animal	   relations.	   These	   plastic	   trays	   that	   are	   found	   in	  
countless	  houses	  and	  apartments	  across	  the	  globe	  are	  typically	  filled	  with	  clay,	  silica	  gel,	  corn	  
or	  wood	  chip,	  in	  which	  pet	  cats	  are	  encouraged	  to	  both	  urinate	  and	  defecate.	  	  Cat	  litter	  trays	  
have	   a	   number	   of	   different	   forms,	   some	   open,	   some	   covered,	   depending	   largely	   upon	   the	  
sensibilities	  of	  either	  the	  cat,	  or	  the	  owner,	  or	   in	  some	  cases	  both.	  A	  quick	  visit	  to	  any	   local	  
pet	   store	   reveals	   a	   variety	   of	   levels	   of	   sophistication	   in	   tray	   design,	   principally	   over	   the	  
methods	  of	  emptying	  the	  soiled	  litter	  once	  the	  cat	  had	  used	  it.	  
	  
‘There	   should	   be	   a	   sufficient	   number	   of	   litter	   trays,	   at	   least	   one	   per	   two	   cats	   and	  
preferably	  one	  per	  cat,	  sited	  away	  from	  feeding	  and	  resting	  areas.	  The	  trays	  should	  be	  
positioned	  in	  a	  quiet	  place	  in	  the	  house	  and	  cleaned	  at	  least	  once	  a	  day.	  Cats	  with	  easy	  
access	  to	  the	  outdoors	  may	  not	  need	  a	   litter	  tray,	  although	  older	  cats,	  those	  who	  do	  
not	  like	  to	  go	  out	  in	  bad	  weather,	  and	  cats	  that	  are	  unwell	  may	  require	  one.	  Cats	  can	  
have	  individual	  preferences	  for	  litter	  characteristics,	  so	  it	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  provide	  
a	  range	  of	  litter	  toes	  and	  designs	  of	  litter	  trays	  (Rochlitz,	  2005,	  101)	  
	  
Cat	  litter	  trays	  or	  boxes	  are	  usually	  made	  of	  moulded	  plastic.	  Manufacturers	  recommend	  that	  
the	  boxes	  or	  trays	  be	  around	  one	  and	  a	  half	  times	  the	  length	  of	  the	  cat	  with	  sides	  between	  12	  
and	   12	   centimetres	   in	   height	   (too	   high	   and	   the	   cat	   won’t	   use	   them,	   to	   low	   and	   they	   will	  
scratch	   the	   litter	   out	   all	   over	   the	   floor).	   Some	   are	   covered;	   most	   are	   open.	   Some	   have	  
pressure	   pads	   and	   alarms	   to	   notify	   ‘owners’	   when	   they	   are	   in	   use.	   Cat	   litter	   trays	   have	  
become	  a	  vital,	  albeit	  temporary,	  form	  of	  animal	  housing	  and	  in	  their	  way	  have	  made	  a	  highly	  
significant	  contribution	  to	  human-­‐animal	  relations.	  
	  
The	   invention	   or	   use	   of	   this	   device,	  which	   appeared	   in	   the	   first	   half	   of	   the	   20th	   Century,	   is	  
almost	   singularly	   responsible	   for	   the	   explosive	   growth	   of	   pet	   cat	   keeping	   in	   central	   urban	  
locations	   and,	   in	   doing	   so,	   has	   helped	   to	   re-­‐configure	   human-­‐animal	   relations	   on	   a	   major	  
scale.	  Up	  until	  the	  1940s,	  most	  cat	  owners	  had	  gardens	  or	  at	  least	  access	  to	  public	  open	  space	  
(Rochlitz,	  2005).	  Cats	  were	   let	  out	  to	  roam,	   like	  the	  felines	  of	  that	  wonderful	  1960s	  cartoon	  
series	  ‘Top	  Cat’.	  Un-­‐neutered	  cats,	  difficult	  to	  keep	  in-­‐doors	  in	  any	  case,	  roamed	  the	  streets	  
and	  gardens	  of	  cities.	  As	  Katherine	  Grier	  writes	   in	  her	  book	  on	  the	  history	  of	  American	  pet-­‐
keeping	  “the	  popularity	  of	  cats	  as	  pets	  was	  compromised	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  their	  owners	  faced	  
the	   unpleasant	   problem	   of	   life	   without	   cat-­‐litter”	   (2006,	   77).	   Although	   desperate	   and	  
enterprising	   owners	   traditionally	   used	   newspapers	   or	   sand,	   it	   was	   not	   until	   the	   late	   1940s	  
that	  a	  commercially	  available	  clay-­‐based	  cat	  litter	  called	  ‘Kitty	  Litter’	  became	  widely	  available,	  
at	   least	   in	   the	  US	  where	   it	  was	   invented	  by	  Edward	  Lowe	   in	  1947	  and	  originally	   sold	   in	  5lb	  
bags.	  	  
	  
With	   this	   invention,	  and	  subsequent	  derivations,	  people	  could	  keep	  pet	  cats	   indoors	  all	   the	  
time	  even	  in	  the	  denser	  housing	  projects	  and	  high-­‐rise	  apartments,	  never	  needing	  to	  let	  them	  
outside.	  	  But	  what	  if	  the	  cats	  wanted	  to	  go	  outside?	  	  With	  the	  increasingly	  popular	  and	  cheap	  
practice	  of	  neutering	  male	  cats	   (around	  80%	  of	  domestic	  male	  cats	  are	  currently	  neutered),	  
making	  them	  a	  lot	  more	  docile	  and	  thereby	  suited	  to	  an	  entirely	  indoor	  life,	  an	  entirely	  new	  
configuration	   of	   the	   species	   felis	   catus	   emerges,	   served	   by	   an	   equally	   docile	   human	  
population,	  now	  charged	  with	  the	  multiple	  tasks	  of	  supplying	  them	  with	  ready-­‐prepared	  food,	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occasional	  affection	  and	  the	  regular	  removal	  of	  used	  cat	  litter.	  Writing	  in	  1988,	  Mertens	  and	  
Schar	   advise	   that	   the	   indoor	   cat	   should	   have	   at	   least	   two	   rooms	   in	   which	   to	   roam,	   while	  
Crouse	  et	  al.	  (1995)	  recommend	  a	  ready	  availability	  of	  cushions.	  
	  
Alongside	   the	  cat	   tray,	  new	  human	  and	  cat	   social	  practices	   (and	  even	  personalities,	  Perrine	  
and	   Osbourne	   1998)	   develop	   in	   which	   both	   cats	   and	   humans	   play	   a	   key	   relational	   role	  	  
(Mertens	  1991;	  Stammbach	  et	  al.	  1999;	  Fox,	  2006;	  Bernstein	  2007).	  	  Franklin	  (2007)	  reminds	  
us	  that	  cats	  do	  not	  meow	  to	  each	  other,	  only	  to	  us	  humans.	  Derrida’s	  cat,	  that	  ‘irreplaceable	  
living	  being’,	  shared	  his	  bedroom	  and	  bathroom.	  Their	  conviviality	  (‘being	  huddled	  together’	  
or	  ‘being	  with’,	  Derrida	  2008,	  10)	  allowed	  them	  both	  to	  look	  at	  each	  other.	  
	  
The	  cat-­‐litter	  tray	  may	  become	  the	  particular	  site	  of	  disruptive	  animal	  agency.	  Not	  all	  cats	  use	  
the	  tray.	  A	  large	  number	  of	  many	  web	  sites	  are	  dedicated	  to	  this	  critical	  societal	  issue.	  Using	  
the	  tray	  to	  defecate	  and	  urinate	  has	  become	  so	  normalised	  in	  human	  expectation	  that	  not	  to	  
do	  so	  is	  taken	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  feline	  unconformity,	  rebellion	  or	  chronic	  unsociability.	  Of	  course,	  in	  
our	  unevenly	   relational	  world,	   that	  usually	  means,	   for	   the	   cat,	   a	  one-­‐way	   trip	   to	   the	  vet	  or	  
animal	  shelter.	  Cats	  do	  not	  use	  the	  tray	  because	  of	  behavioural	  aversions,	  medical	   reasons,	  
because	  they	  don’t	   like	  the	  litter,	  because	  they	  don’t	   like	  the	  location	  of	  the	  box	  and	  so	  on.	  	  
The	   box	   or	   tray	   becomes	   a	   device	   for	   the	   expression	   of	   their	   subjectivity.	   As	   one	   website	  
advises:	  “If	  your	  cat	  associates	  her	  litter	  box	  with	  unpleasant	  things,	  you	  can	  work	  to	  help	  her	  
develop	  new	  and	  pleasant	  associations”.	  
	  
The	   final	   point	   I	   want	   to	   consider	   relating	   to	   cat-­‐litter	   boxes	   as	   physical	   infrastructure	  
concerns	  their	  role	  in	  the	  more	  material	  biotic	  pathways	  and	  practices	  that	  link	  humans	  and	  
non-­‐humans.	   Cat	   faeces	   is	   a	   well-­‐known	   source	   entero-­‐pathogenes	   such	   as	   toxoplasmosis	  
and,	   less	   commonly,	   toxocariasis,	   both	   of	   which	   have	   significant	   implications	   for	   human	  
health	   (particularly	   for	   unborn	   children)	   and	   are	   acknowledged	   to	   be	   on	   the	   rise	   within	  
domestic	  households.	  The	  presence	  of	  cat	  faeces	  in	  the	  home,	  (i.e.,	  in	  the	  litter	  tray)	  is	  clearly	  
a	   source	  of	   potential	   transmission.	  However,	   the	   faeces	   is	   not	   generally	   contagious	   for	   the	  
first	  48	  hours	  after	  excretion	  and	  to	  avoid	  transmission,	  best	  practice	  is	  to	  empty	  the	  tray	  as	  
soon	  as	  possible.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  social	  practices	  that	  have	  developed	  around	  in-­‐door	  pet	  
keeping	  tend	  to	  mitigate	  against	  this	  with	  home-­‐owners	  preferring	  generally	  to	  leave	  faeces	  
to	  dry	  out	  before	  removing	  and	  changing	  the	  litter.	  This,	  many	  feel,	  also	  helps	  the	  cat	  locate	  
the	   litter	   tray	   for	   further	   use.	   The	   result	   is	   a	   clear	   increase	   in	   the	   potential	   for	   zoonotic	  
infection	   yet	   pet	   keeping,	   as	   a	   social	   practice,	   comes	  with,	   for	  many	  pet	   keepers,	   a	   sort	   of	  
systematic	  denial	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  zoonotic	  pathways	  as	  if	  cross-­‐species	  infection	  was	  
just	  something	  that	  is	  not	  done	  in	  the	  modern	  extended	  multi-­‐species	  family	  
	  
	  
The	  farrowing	  crate	  
	  
For	   this	   second	   example,	   I	   want	   to	   draw	   upon	   Dawn	   Coppin’s	   (2003;	   2009)	   illuminating	  
analysis	  of	   the	   farrowing	   crate	   in	   intensive	  pig	  production	  and	   the	  manner	   in	  which,	   in	  her	  
words,	   ‘the	  sow’s	  agency	  as	  a	   temporally	  emergent	  phenomenon	   […]	  arises	   in	  coordination	  
with	  the	  physical	  environment	  and	  the	  human	  management	  system’	   (2009,	  53).	  Tracing	  the	  
development	  of	  this	  particular	  form	  of	  confinement,	  Coppin	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  adoption	  
of	  farrowing	  crates	  reconfigures	  relations	  between	  farmer,	  pig,	  the	  materiality	  of	  the	  ‘crate’	  
itself	  and	  the	  wider	  public	  in	  both	  foreseen	  and	  unforeseen	  ways.	  
	  
Farrowing	  pens,	   commonly	  barred-­‐steel	   sided	  boxes	   around	  200-­‐250	   x	   50-­‐90	   cm,	   each	  one	  
holding	   a	   single	   sow	   from	   late	   pregnancy	   to	   the	  weaning	   of	   her	   piglets,	   are	   commonplace	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within	   intensive	   pig	   production	   (gestating	   crates	   having	   been	   banned,	   at	   least	   within	   the	  
European	  Union).	  For	  producers,	  they	  have	  historically	  offered	  a	  number	  of	  advantages	  over	  
free-­‐range	   or	   open	   housing	   systems.	   They	   greatly	   facilitate	   intensive	   production	   methods	  
(with	  corresponding	   reductions	   in	   individual	  human	   labour	   input)	  and	  permit	  all-­‐year-­‐round	  
farrowing	   within	   indoor	   housing	   units.	   Critically,	   they	   protect	   the	   newly-­‐born	   piglets	   from	  
being	   inadvertedly	  crushed	  by	  the	  sow	  during	  the	   farrowing	  period,	   thereby	  allowing	  viable	  
increases	   to	   be	   achieved	   in	   the	   number	   of	   piglets	   born	   to	   each	   sow	   through	   advances	   in	  
genetic	   and	   reproductive	   technologies.	   Here	   there	   is	   a	   trade-­‐off	   between	   the	   health	   and	  
welfare	  of	   the	  piglets,	  which	  will	   grow	   to	  be	   sold	   for	   slaughter	   and	   that	  of	   the	   sow	  who	   is	  
likely	  to	  be	  required	  to	  produce	  at	  least	  two	  litters	  (of	  10	  to	  12	  piglets)	  per	  annum	  for	  two	  to	  
three	  years	  before	  culling.	  Confined	   indoor	  systems,	  with	  regulated	  environments,	   feed	  and	  
medical	   regimes	   allow	   for	   more	   productive	   sows	   and	   larger	   litters	   which	   then	   necessitate	  
further	  elements	  of	  confinement.	  
	  
As	   Coppin	   (2009)	   shows,	   the	   agency	   of	   the	   sow	   is	   constantly	   frustrated	   and	   thwarted.	   She	  
cannot	  turn	  around,	  she	  is	  obliged	  to	  rest	  on	  hard	  surfaces	  with	   little	  or	  no	  bedding	  (as	  this	  
interferes	  with	  the	  manure	  management	  system)	  leading	  to	  sores	  and	  injuries.	  She	  often	  lies	  
in	  her	  own	  manure	  and	  urine,	  whether	  on	  solid	  or	  slatted	  flooring,	  and	  has	  little	  opportunity	  
to	   stand.	   Finally,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   bedding	   material,	   she	   cannot	   indulge	   in	   nest-­‐building	  
behaviour	  despite	  a	  generally	  high	  motivation	  to	  do	  so	  during	  the	  farrowing	  period,	  nor	  can	  
she	   satisfactorily	   interact	   with	   her	   piglets.	   The	   sow’s	   frustration	   plays	   out	   in	   behavioural	  
responses,	   from	   aggression	   and	   the	   savaging	   of	   piglets	   to	   the	   gnawing	   of	   the	   crate	   bars,	  
general	  welfare	  decline	  and	  still-­‐born	  piglets.	  
	  
Drawing	  on	  Foucault,	  Coppin’s	  aim	  is	  to	  show,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  how	  the	  disciplining	  of	  sows	  
under	   intensive	   regimes	   creates	  a	  new	   form	  of	  domesticated,	  docile	  and	  disciplined	  animal	  
via	   what	   is	   a	   fundamentally	   unsymmetrical	   human/animal	   relationship	   and,	   on	   the	   other	  
hand,	   to	   demonstrate	   how	   the	   processes	   of	   disciplining	   and	   being	   disciplined	   also	   includes	  
farmers,	   obliged	   to	   enter	   into	   new	   animal	   management	   practices,	   and	   other	   disciplinary	  
agents,	  from	  animal	  researchers,	  required	  to	  find	  new	  parameters	  for	  assessing	  the	  welfare	  of	  
the	   sows	   to	   an	   vocal	   animal	   welfare	   lobby	   increasingly	   mobilised	   in	   the	   advocacy	   of	   free	  
farrowing	  systems.	  Thus,	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  pig	  husbandry	  is	  altered,	  as	  Porcher	  (2010)	  has	  so	  
vividly	  described,	  as	  the	  particular	  confinement	  of	  the	  farrowing	  cage	  engenders	  agency	  (and,	  
in	  Porcher’s	  study,	  suffering)	  in	  both	  keepers	  and	  kept.	  
	  
Increasingly,	   in	   a	   number	   of	   countries,	   there	   are	   calls	   for	   the	   abandonment	   of	   farrowing	  
crates	  and	  their	  replacement	  by	  what	  are	  known	  as	  ‘free	  farrowing	  systems’	  (FAWC,	  2015).	  A	  
different	   configuration	   of	   human/animal	   and	   sow/piglet	   agency	   emerges	   from	   these	  
alternative	   confinement	   methods.	   	   While	   the	   value	   of	   crated	   farrowing	   in	   terms	   of	  
productivity	  and	  efficiency	  is	  widely	  acknowledged,	  free	  farrowing	  systems	  do	  offer	  the	  sows	  
the	   chance	   for	   greater	   freedom	   of	   expression	   and	   ‘natural’	   behaviour	   as	   well	   as	   greater	  
interaction	   with	   their	   litters,	   though	   they	   may	   result	   in	   higher	   levels	   of	   piglet	   mortality	  
through	  maternal	  crushing.	  To	  overcome	  this,	  sows	  are	  encouraged	  to	  be	  ‘better	  mothers’	  by	  
displaying	  good	  maternal	  behaviour,	  something	  that	  is	  difficult	  in	  the	  conventional	  farrowing	  
crates	  (Weschler	  and	  Weber,	  2007).	  The	  role	  and	  agency	  of	  the	  farmers	  too	  is	  changed.	  While	  
close	   access	   to	   the	   farrowing	   sows	   might	   be	   more	   physically	   difficult	   in	   free	   systems,	  
additional	  attentiveness	  is	  often	  required	  in	  free	  or	  grouped	  facilities.	  Both	  the	  sows	  and	  the	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The	  final	  house:	  the	  house	  of	  slaughter	  
	  
In	   his	   book	   ‘Meat’	   from	   1991,	   the	   anthropologist	   Nick	   Fiddes	  wrote	   that	   for	  many	   human	  
societies,	   the	   killing	   of	   animals	   and	   the	   eating	   of	  meat	   symbolizes	   a	   (masculine)	   desire	   for	  
domination	   and	   control	   over	   the	   natural	   world.	   To	   kill	   and	   to	   eat	   is	   a	   form	   of	   mastery.	  
Arguably,	  at	  least	  in	  Western	  societies,	  it	   is	  constant	  signifier	  of	  human	  superiority	  over	  ‘the	  
beast’	  –	  a	  Cartesian	  de-­‐signification	  of	  the	  animal.	  	  
	  
For	  Fiddes,	  modernity’s	  domination	  and	  control	  over	   ‘Nature’	  achieves	  almost	   its	  apogee	   in	  
the	   violence	  of	   contemporary	   animal	   killing.	   Fiddes	   (1991)	   parallels	   the	  dramatic	   growth	   in	  
animal	   farming	   and	   meat	   consumption	   with	   the	   Industrial	   Revolution	   and	   its	   aftermath.	  
Perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  most	  evocative	  expressions	  of	  this	  early	  modernist	  mastery	  was	  contained	  
in	  those	  dramatic	  sections	  of	  Upton	  Sinclair’s	  famous	  book	  entitled	  ‘The	  Jungle,	  published	  in	  
1906,	   that	   dealt	   with	   the	   slaughterhouses	   of	   Chicago.	   Later,	   Derrida	   (1990)	   refers	   to	   the	  
technological	   violence	   towards	   animals	   –	   and	   the	   non-­‐criminal	   putting	   them	   to	   death	   -­‐	   	   as	  
being	   ‘vital	   to	   our	   modernity’	   (p.	   953).	   Modernity,	   its	   economies,	   its	   technologies	   and	  
sciences	  of	  confinement	  and	  constraint,	  have	  made	  the	  killing	  of	  farm	  animals	  so	  frequent,	  so	  
intense	   and	   so	   integral	   to	   modern	   economies	   that	   is	   has	   become	   infinitely	   banal	   (Shukin,	  
2010;	  Pachirat	  2011).	  	  
	  
The	   slaughterhouse,	   with	   its	   inverse-­‐Fordist	   dis-­‐assembly	   lines,	   is	   a	   temple	   to	   progressive	  
modernity.	  Paula	  Young	  Lee	  (2008,	  2)	  refers	  to	  the	  slaughterhouse	  as	  “one	  of	  the	  exemplary	  
institutions	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century”	  and	  certainly	  the	  very	  name	  has	  that	  ring	  to	   it	  –	   like	  
‘wash-­‐house’	   or	   ‘poor-­‐house’.	   Even	   today,	   slaughterhouses	   remain	   linear	   and	   highly	  
serialized,	  with	  compartments	  and	  task	  divisions	  that	  strongly	  resemble	  those	  early	  twentieth	  
century	  manufacturing	  assembly	  lines.	  
	  
Slaughterhouses	   though,	   are	   above	   all	   places	   of	   violence,	   though	   they	   are	   ethically	  
paradoxical	   and	   contradictory	   places.	   As	   Mick	   Smith	   (2002)	   has	   pointed	   out,	   in	   societies	  
where	  the	  intentional	  killing	  of	  animals	  is	  generally	  abhorred,	  we	  kill	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  
each	  year	   in	   these	   industrialized	  killing	   facilities.	   	  We	  deal	  with	   that	  paradox	   in	   three	  ways:	  
first,	  physically,	  by	  removing	  slaughter	  from	  our	  view	  in	  discreet	  units;	  second,	  juridically,	  by	  
defining	   the	  parameters	  of	  killing	   increasingly	   tightly	  under	   the	   intrinsically	   ironic	  banner	  of	  
‘humane-­‐ness’	   and	   ‘welfare’	   and;	   third,	   through	   a	   process	   of	   normalization	   of	   slaughter	  
practices	  (which	  incorporates	  a	  rejection	  of	  less	  ‘modern’	  practices	  such	  as	  Shekita	  and	  Halal	  
slaughter).	  
	  
What	  is	  the	  role	  of	  violence	  in	  animal	  killing	  and	  of	  rendering	  their	  bodies	  eat-­‐able?	  What	  sort	  
of	  violence	  is	  this?	  	  Does	  the	  violence	  reside	  in	  the	  act	  of	  killing	  (is	  killing	  inherently	  violent),	  
does	  it	  lie	  in	  the	  reasons	  behind	  the	  act	  (killing	  to	  eat	  or	  killing	  to	  end	  suffering)	  or	  rather	  is	  it	  
found	  in	  the	  mechanics	  of	  the	  act	  (with	  a	  pill	  or	  with	  a	  knife)	  or	  even	  in	  the	  aesthetics	  of	  the	  
act	  (we	  might	  find	  the	  physical	  and	  material	  excesses	  of	  blunt	  force	  trauma	  unacceptable	  and	  
yet	  be	  more	  at	  ease	  with	  suffocation	  -­‐	  say	  of	  a	  fish).	  When	  does	  the	  violence	  start	  –	  perhaps	  
at	   the	   very	   definition	   of	   certain	   animaIs	   as	   ‘kill-­‐able’?	   	   When	   does	   it	   stop	   (with	   death	   or	  
beyond)?	  	  Is	  there	  ever	  a	  less	  violent	  way	  to	  kill	  and	  to	  eat?	  
	  
‘There	  is	  no	  way	  to	  eat	  and	  not	  to	  kill’	  writes	  Haraway.	  But	  there	  are	  many	  ways	  of	  killing	  –	  
both	  direct	   and	   indirect	   -­‐	   and,	  we	  might	   argue,	   not	   all	   are	   equally	   violent.	   The	   trouble,	   for	  
many,	   is	   that	   there	   is	  always	  a	  violence	   in	   the	  process	  by	  which	  we	  kill	   the	  animals	  we	  eat.	  
Indeed	   that	  violence	  has	  become	  an	  absolutely	   critical	  and	  systematic	  element	   in	  achieving	  
the	  transition	  from	  the	  vibrant	  materiality	  of	   the	   living	  body	  to	  the	  somehow	  very	  different	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silent	   materiality	   of	   the	   edible	   foodstuff.	   And	   that	   violence	   is	   always	   imprinted	   on	   that	  
subsequent	  material	  form.	  
	  
The	   reasons	   for	   	   -­‐	   the	   apparent	   need	   for	   this	   violence	   are	   clear.	   The	   most	   obvious	   is	   for	  
reasons	  of	  health	  –	  the	  health	  of	  the	  consuming	  body,	  rather	  than	  the	  consumed	  body.	  The	  
dead	   animal	   body	   decays	   fast:	   the	   faster	   the	   killing	   and	   the	   proximity	   of	   killing	   to	  
consumption	  (or	  preparation),	  the	  lower	  the	  risk	  of	  contamination	  and	  infection.	  	  So	  violence	  
is	  necessary	  for	  speedy	  dispatch.	  While	  technology	  allows	  us	  to	   lengthen	  the	  distance	  (both	  
spatial	   and	   temporal)	   between	   killing	   and	   consumption,	   the	   time-­‐scale	   of	   processing,	   from	  
slaughter	  to	  processing	  are,	  in	  fact,	  becoming	  shorter	  and	  shorter.	  The	  second	  obvious	  reason	  
for	   the	  killing	  of	   livestock	   to	  be	   inherently	  violent	   is	   the	  control	  of	   supply.	  Human	  societies	  
farm	  and	  kill	   animals	  according	   to	  a	   rhythm	  of	   supply	  and	  demand.	  Within	   the	   field-­‐to-­‐fork	  
production	   cycle,	   slaughter	   time	   (like	   life-­‐time)	   becomes	   a	   significant	   variable	   and	  must	   be	  
minimized.	  	  
	  
A	  third	  reason	  why	  killing	  needs	  to	  be	  violent	  is	  because	  it	  must	  kill.	  It	  cannot	  wound	  or	  mildly	  
discomfort.	  To	  kill	  effectively,	  the	  heart	  must	  be	  stopped	  and	  brain	  activity	  cease.	  This	  cannot	  
be	  achieved	  through	  gentle	  persuasion.	  The	  problem	  for	  livestock	  production	  is	  that	  this	  must	  
be	  achieved	  while	  maintaining	  not	  only	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  animal	  body,	  both	  for	  reasons	  of	  
value,	  but	  also	  the	  relative	  purity	  of	  the	  animal	  body.	  Stock	  animals	  cannot	  be	  ‘put	  to	  sleep’,	  
in	   that	   gentle	  metaphoric	  way	  we	   intentionally	   end	   the	   lives	  of	  our	  pet	   cats	   and	  dogs.	   The	  
residue	  of	  the	  killing	  chemical	  would	  render	  the	  animal’s	  body	  unfit	  for	  consumption.	  
	  
The	  mode	  of	  killing	   (in	  other	  words,	   the	  speed,	   the	  violence)	   critically	  affects	   the	  quality	  of	  
the	  meat	  product.	  An	  animal	  that	  becomes	  fearful	  or	  panicked	  will	  release	  hormones	  into	  its	  
body	  pre-­‐mortem,	  which	  taint	   the	  meat.	  An	  animal	   that	  suffers	  and	  struggles	  against	  death	  
will	   create	   damaged	  muscle	   tissue	   and	   internal	   bleeding,	   visible	   to	   the	   consumer.	   Violence	  
makes	  economic	  good	  sense	  for	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  final	  product.	  There	  are	  no	  gentle	  ways	  to	  
kill	  for	  consumption.	  
	  
There	  is	  also	  an	  ethics	  here,	  the	  faster	  we	  kill,	  the	  shorter	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  killed.	  For	  
philosophers	  like	  Peter	  Singer,	  this	  is	  critical.	  He	  has	  famously	  argued	  that	  were	  we	  able	  to	  kill	  
food	  animals	  entirely	  without	  suffering,	  and	  ensure	  that	  the	  dead	  animal	  is	  always	  ‘replaced’	  
by	  a	  live	  one;	  he	  sees	  no	  intrinsic	  moral	  complaint	  with	  animal	  killing	  for	  human	  consumption	  
(Singer,	  2008).	  Do	  we	  then	  correlate	  ‘violence’	  with	  suffering?	  In	  his	  book	  ‘The	  Ethics	  of	  What	  
We	   Heat’,	   he	   approvingly	   quotes	   the	   TV	   chef,	   Hugh	   Fernley-­‐Whittingstall	   who,	   in	   his	   own	  
book	  ‘Meat’	  (2004)	  writes:	  ‘truly	  wild	  animals,	  dispatched	  efficiently	  by	  a	  good	  shot,	  provide	  
us	  with	  meat	  that	  is	  perhaps	  the	  least	  ethically	  problematic	  of	  all’.	  	  
	  
The	  irony	  is	  that	  with	  growing	  societal	  ethical	  concern	  over	  animal	  welfare,	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  
kill	  well	  (i.e	  without	  suffering),	  we	  have	  become,	  in	  some	  ways,	  more	  ‘violent’	  in	  the	  manner	  
of	  animal	  killing	  as	  the	  focus	  has	  been	  on	  speed	  and	  instaneity	  of	  death.	  (Here	  I	  take	  a	  rather	  
traditional	  notion	  of	  violence	  –	  which	  I	  accept	  is	  perhaps	  a	  little	  limited	  in	  scope:	  violence	  as	  
‘physical	  force’).	  	  The	  force	  of	  the	  percussive	  bolt,	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  electric	  current	  and	  so	  
on…	   Moreover,	   that	   violence	   is	   increasingly	   technologized,	   undertaken	   in	   wholly	   artificial	  
environments	   that	   resemble	   nothing	   of	   Fernley-­‐Whittingstall’s,	   romantic	   vision	   of	   outdoor	  
slaughter,	  in	  a	  field	  with	  a	  rifle.	  	  	  
	  
So,	   acknowledging,	  what	   Fitzgerald	   (2010)	   identifies	   as	   a	   growing	   tension	   in	   ‘post-­‐domestic	  
cultures’	  between	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  a	  growing	  concern	  for	  animal	  welfare	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  
animal	  lives	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  ever	  increasing	  demands	  for	  meat,	  we	  might	  wonder	  (as	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we	  change	  some	  of	  the	  conditions	  and	  assumptions	  of	  modernity),	  what	  might	  be	  the	  nature	  
of	  the	  ‘post-­‐modern’	  abattoir	  and	  the	  place	  of	  violence	  within	  it.	  Might	  it	  be	  made	  of	  glass	  as	  
Pollan	  (2006)	  suggests?	  
	  
	  
‘but	  maybe	  all	  we	  need	  to	  do	  to	  redeem	  industrial	  animal	  agriculture	  in	  this	  country	  is	  
to	   pass	   a	   law	   requiring	   that	   the	   steel	   and	   concrete	   walls	   of	   the	   CAFO’s	   and	  
slaughterhouses	   be	   replaced	   with	   .	   .	   .	   glass.	   If	   there’s	   any	   new	   “right”	   we	   need	   to	  
establish,	   maybe	   it’s	   this	   one:	   the	   right	   to	   look.	   […].	   Were	   the	   walls	   of	   our	   meat	  
industry	   to	   become	   transparent,	   literally	   or	   even	   figuratively,	   we	   would	   not	   long	  
continue	   to	   do	   it	   this	   way.	   Tail-­‐docking	   and	   sow	   crates	   and	   beak-­‐clipping	   would	  
disappear	  overnight,	   and	   the	  days	  of	   slaughtering	   400	  head	  of	   cattle	   an	  hour	  would	  
come	  to	  an	  end.	  For	  who	  could	  stand	  the	  sight?	  Yes,	  meat	  would	  get	  more	  expensive.	  
We’d	  probably	  eat	  less	  of	  it,	  too,	  but	  maybe	  when	  we	  did	  eat	  animals,	  we’d	  eat	  them	  
with	  the	  consciousness,	  ceremony	  and	  respect	  they	  deserve.	  (Pollan,	  2002)	  .	  
	  
Might	  a	  post-­‐modern	  abattoir	  be	  one	  without	  animals	  and	  without	  killing	  or	  perhaps	  a	  place	  
where	   animals	   ‘die	   naturally’	   (should	   we	   move	   from	   carnivorousness	   to	   carrion-­‐eaters?).	  
Perhaps,	   it	  will	  be	  a	   site	  where	  new	   forms	  of	   life	  are	   converted	   to	   food,	  be	   they	   insects	  or	  
forms	  of	  ‘mould’	  or	  even	  cellular	  and	  microbial	  ‘life’	  from	  which	  ‘meat’	  is	  only	  ‘grown’…	  
	  
Abattoirs,	  farrowing	  crates,	  cat	  litter	  trays	  ….	  	  all	  the	  various	  forms	  of	  animal	  housing,	  animal	  
confinement	  and	  human/animal	  place-­‐sharing	  described	  in	  this	  book	  have	  generated,	  and	  are	  
generated	  from	  a	  range	  of	  shared	  practices	  and	  shared	  technologies.	  These	  in	  turn	  come	  to	  
define	   the	  meaning,	   the	  agency	  and	   the	   subjectivity	  both	   the	   keeper	   and	   the	   kept.	  Houses	  
are,	  in	  varying	  degrees,	  dialectic	  spaces,	  enshrining	  both	  confinement	  and	  freedom,	  self	  and	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